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Abstract
Firms naturally want to hire workers who are fast-learners and committed for long periods. Finding such people or
carefully screening applicants is costly whether done directly by the ®rm or with the help of a recruitment agency. We
explore the trade-os involved in determining the eort/investment that should be expended on ``quality control'' in
hiring. We envision a ®rm that has to decide which proportion of its hiring to do using a ``careful'' but expensive
agency. Agencies may provide discounts to ®rms who do most of their hiring through them. Workers dier in their
learning curve and in their (random) length of stay in the job/®rm. We provide sucient conditions for using only one
agency. We also explore the relations between turnover and productivity, which at times turn out to be quite counter-
intuitive. For example, reduced turnover may adversely eect productivity even in the presence of learning with
experience. Ó 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Human resource management; Turnover; Learning curve; Renewal±reward stochastic models; Stochastic
order
1. Introduction
The negative impact of high labor turnover on
®rms in terms of productivity and hiring costs is
widely recognized (e.g., Staw, 1980; Mobley, 1982;
Cascio, 1987; Mercer, 1988; Phillips, 1990).
McEvoy and Cascio (1985) analyze two strategies
aimed at reducing turnover (realistic job previews
and job enrichment programs) and ®nd that the
former strategy is generally more eective. Huselid
(1995) study the impact of HRM practices on ®rm
performance. Based on a survey of 1000 ®rms he
argues that practices such as training, employee
involvement, etc. cause signi®cant turnover re-
duction and productivity enhancements. Pinkovitz
et al. (1996) report on national turnover statistics
in the USA and highlight the magnitude of turn-
over costs in dierent sectors. They develop a
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turnover costs. Fitz-Enz (1977) reports on ®ndings
gathered at the Saratoga Institute where the costs
of turnover were investigated. Nevertheless, as
stated by Hutchinson et al. (1997, pp. 3202±3203),
``While there is an immense literature covering the
subject of personnel turnover, there is a paucity of
writing on the impact of turnover on the organi-
zation''. Hutchinson et al. (1997) also point out
that little attention has been paid to the eect of
high turnover on throughput, via the impact of
learning curves. It is our intention to explore the
implication of hiring policies on turnover, pro-
ductivity and output in an environment of uncer-
tain turnover.
Partly as a result of the importance and di-
culty of identifying potentially stable (i.e., com-
mitted to the ®rm for relatively long time) and
productive workers, ®rms are increasingly relying
on personnel agencies and recruitment specialists
to supply them with the ``right'' kind of workers.
These situations are encountered in various in-
dustries and with dierent functional positions.
For example, an Israeli manufacturer of advanced
medical diagnostic equipment experienced annual
turnover of about 25% in its engineering work-
force during the late 1980s. Management viewed
this situation as not altogether negative since the
company enjoyed a fresh supply of younger engi-
neers who created an atmosphere of continuing
rejuvenation. The company simultaneously em-
ployed several manpower agencies to meet its
needs for quali®ed engineers. Hiring requirements
were spread among the competing agencies and
priority was given to agencies with proven track
record. Another example taken from the Israeli
marketplace relates to metal cutting ± an industry
that experiences shortages of welders, tool and die
workers, operators of computer numerically con-
trolled machines, etc. These ®rms employ several
personnel agencies in order to broaden their reach
(especially along geographic and ethnic dimen-
sions) and in order to avoid being dependent on a
single recruiting channel (a policy that may lead to
higher commission fees for any given agency). In
most cases, the hiring needs expressed by the ®rm
are not accompanied by price dierences among
the agencies. However, in some instances, a ®rm
may be willing to pay an extra fee to speci®c
agencies, especially when its manpower require-
ments are relatively large and urgent. For example,
large construction companies in Israel repeatedly
face shortages in skilled construction workers. In
recent years, they have adopted the practice of
allocating a certain proportion of their hiring
needs to personnel agencies that specialize in re-
cruiting foreign workers (mainly from Romania,
Turkey and Thailand). The construction compa-
nies assign these agencies speci®c recruitment tar-
gets while leaving a certain proportion of the
hiring to be done locally in Israel. Moreover, since
there are marked dierences in the costs involved
in recruiting and transporting workers from these
countries, the prices paid to the relevant agencies
dier.
The personnel recruitment industry, like most
others, consists of agencies which vary by quality
and price. Quality here is, of course, multidimen-
sional, but some of its key dimensions are the
learning rate, productivity, and stability of work-
ers the agency supplies. Naturally, though, while
careful recruiters may be able to ®nd workers who
tend to be more stable and/or more productive or
fast learners than those found by less careful
agencies, the actual performance will vary from
worker to worker. An analysis of the economic
trade-os involved in hiring has to take these un-
certainties into account. As we shall see, this
uncertainty could give rise to some surprising ob-
servations and implications.
Research on personnel agencies and their use
by employers confronted with turnover has pro-
liferated in the last decade. Holzer (1987) develops
an employer search model in which ®rms choose
hiring procedures as well as production levels. The
outcomes of their choices (expected vacancies,
expected productivity, resources devoted to re-
cruitment, etc.) are then evaluated. Scott (1994)
describes basic characteristics of personnel agen-
cies, the nature of the competition among them
and the reasons that employers use them. Feldman
et al. (1997) surveys 1312 personnel agencies and
®nd that agencies that are older, larger and gen-
erate larger revenues tend to be more generalist in
nature (serve more industries, functions and geo-
graphical regions). These agencies are typically
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The survey strongly motivates dierential con-
tractual agreements between an employer and the
agencies that serve its needs.
Consider then a ®rm which has to decide what
proportion, if any, of its hiring business to conduct
through each of the several personnel agencies.
Each agency's track record is summarized by the
completed-length-of-service (CLS) distribution of
the workers it supplies, and by their realized
learning curves. The price per worker charged by
each agency may depend, to some extent, on a
precommittment by the ®rm as to the proportion
of its hiring to be done through the agency.
We formulate a general renewal±reward model
of these trade-os. We then optimize it with re-
spect to the proportion of workers hired via each
of the two agencies. If agencies provide ``quantity
(proportion of client's business) discounts'', it
might be optimal to use a mix of agencies. In the
absence of such discounts, only a single agency will
be used, and the choice will be according to a
rather interpretable criterion (Proposition 1). The
choice criterion is then specialized to cases where
agencies dier only in the productivity (but not
stability) of workers they supply, and vice versa.
One speci®c way to model the ``quality'' of a
personnel agency is by the proportion of ``good''
workers, in terms of stability and productivity,
among those it provides. A convenient device to
capture that is a mixture. Potential recruits are
assumed to consist of two subgroups, one rela-
tively more stable and productive than the other.
A higher quality agency is then one which supplies
a higher proportion of the more desirable type.
It is instructive to zero in on a ®rm's choice
between CLS distributions. That will be relevant if
the only discerniable dierence between agencies is
in the stability of workers they supply. However, it
is even more directly relevant to a situation where
the ®rm itself is contemplating an internal turn-
over-reduction eort (not necessarily through
more careful hiring), in the hope of achieving
productivity gains.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 presents the general renewal±reward
model of the trade-os involved. Section 3 focuses
on the case where no quantity discounts are
oered. Section 4 analyzes the eects of stability
(reduced turnover) on overall productivity and
provides examples where increased turnover is
bene®cial. Section 5 oers some conclusions.
2. The general model
Suppose that personnel agency i;i  1;...;n;
charges the ®rm hiai per recruit if the ®rm com-
mits to hire a fraction ai of its workers from that
agency, where
Pn
i1 ai  1. We restrict the current
model to situations in which the proportions ai
hired through various agencies remain ®xed
throughout the analysis horizon. Naturally, hi are
nonincreasing functions. Internal expenses in-
curred by the ®rm in each turnover instance are
also included in hi. Agency i delivers workers
whose random length of service has a cumulative
distribution function Fi, referred to as the CLS
distribution (Bartholomew, 1982; Bartholomew
et al., 1991). Let li be the corresponding expected
value of the completed length-of-stay of workers
supplied by agency i.
To simplify the presentation and notation, in
the rest of this section we focus on the case n  2.
Then, writing a1  a and a2  1 ÿ a, we have
ECLSal1  1 ÿ al2: 1
Assume, without loss of generality, that the
revenue per unit of output is 1. The workers sup-
plied by agency i exhibit a production/learning
curve function /i, where /ix is the quality-ad-
justed output per-unit-time of a worker with ex-
perience (i.e., length of service) x. Naturally, /ix
are nondecreasing functions (e.g., Yelle, 1979;
Smunt, 1986; Gerchak et al., 1990). In practice,
initial productivity could vary by prior experience
and learning rate could also vary from worker to
worker. However, in order to highlight the con-
sequences of uncertain length-of-stay we posit a
deterministic production/learning function /.
If the successive CLSs are independent and
identically distributed, a rather plausible assump-
tion, which we shall make (in line with Bartholo-
mew, 1982; Stanford, 1985 and others), the
turnover in each position (job) can be modeled as a
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1985; Gerchak and Kubat, 1986). Thus, a worker's
experience in a job at any point in time is the ``age''
of the renewal process at that time. The (asymp-
totic) age distribution of a renewal process equals
(e.g., Ross, 1996; Wol, 1989),
Z x
0
 Fydy=l; 2
where  F  1 ÿ F. This distribution is called the
``equilibrium'' distribution Fe corresponding to F.
Its mean equals
le  EX
2=2l: 3
Thus, the expected productivity of a ``random''
worker is
Z 1
0
/xdFex
Z 1
0
/x Fxdx=l: 4
As workers originating from dierent agencies
have dierent CLS distributions, their age distri-
butions will also be dierent. Let
Ri 
Z 1
0
/ix Fixdx=li; i  1;2: 5
be the expected productivity of a random-experi-
ence worker originally supplied by agency i.
Regarding the system as a renewal±reward
process, the long-term average pro®t per employee
per unit time can be computed as the ratio of the
expected pro®t per ``cycle'' (an employee's career
at the job) and the expected length of cycle (given
in Eq. (1)).
Denoting this ratio by Pa, we thus have
Pa
aR1  1 ÿ aR2 ÿ ah1aÿ 1 ÿ ah2a
al1  1 ÿ al2
:
6
Note that we have rede®ned h2 to be a (nonde-
creasing) function of a, the proportion of business
handled by the other (®rst) agency.
Dierentiating (6) with respect to a and sim-
plifying, we obtain
P
0a
al1 1ÿal2 ah0
2 ÿh0
1ÿh0
2l1h2 ÿl2h1 l2R1 ÿl1R2
al1 1ÿal2
2 :
7
It is not easy to establish conditions which guar-
antee concavity of Pa at this level of generality.
For the special case of equal mean CLSs,
l1  l2  l, we can write
P
0af  h
0
2 ÿ h
0
1a ÿ h
0
2  h2 ÿ h1  R1 ÿ R2g=l;
8
so
P
00af  h
00
2 ÿ h
00
1a ÿ h
00
2  2h
0
2 ÿ h
0
1g=l: 9
Recall that h0
1 < 0a n dh0
2 > 0. It is thus plausible
to assume that h00
1 > 0a n dh00
2 < 0. However, the
sign of P00a is not clear. Equating P0a to zero
results in the optimality condition
h
0
2 ÿ h
0
1a ÿ h
0
2 ÿ  h2 ÿ h1 ÿ DR; 10
where DR  R1 ÿ R2.
Example. Let h1ah1e1ÿa, and h2ah2eaÿ1;
06a61 , where 0 < h1 < h2. These functions are
illustrated in Fig. 1.
Then
h
0
1aÿ h1e
1ÿa; h
0
2ah2e
aÿ1
h
00
1ah1e
1ÿa; h
00
2ah2e
aÿ1:
Fig. 1. Hiring cost functions.
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P
00aa h2e
aÿ1 ÿ
ÿ h1e
1ÿa
ÿ h2e
aÿ1
 2 h2e
aÿ1 ÿ
 h1e
1ÿa
 a  1h2e
aÿ1  2 ÿ ah1e
1ÿa > 0;
8 06a61
) existence of a unique interior minimum:
Now, using (9), we equate P0a to zero,
P
0a0 ) h2e
aÿ1 ÿ
 h1e
1ÿa
a ÿ h2e
aÿ1  h2e
aÿ1
ÿ h1e
1ÿa  R1 ÿ R2  0
) ah2e
aÿ1  a ÿ 1h1e
1ÿa  R2 ÿ R1:
Thus if, for example, h2  2; h1  1a n d
R2 ÿ R1  0:8, then the numerical solution of the
above is a  0:74. That is, 74% of the hiring
should be done via the ®rst agency, which is
cheaper but whose workers have a somewhat
lower expected productivity.
3. No volume discounts
The prevailing practice in the personnel indus-
try today does not provide ®rms with volume
discounts. If agencies charge a ®xed rate per hiree
regardless of how much hiring the ®rm does
through them, the functions h1 and h2 become
constants. Then the expected pro®t per unit time
becomes
Pa
aR1  1 ÿ aR2 ÿ ah1 ÿ 1 ÿ ah2
al1  1 ÿ al2
: 11
Thus,
P
0a
l2R1 ÿ l1R2 ÿ l2h1  l1h2
al1  1 ÿ al2
2 : 12
We note that the numerator of P0a does not
contain a. Thus, Pa is monotone, and its direc-
tion, which determines whether a  0o ra  1i s
optimal, depends on the sign of the numerator of
P0a. Recalling what the Ri's represent, we thus
have:
Proposition 1. Suppose that h1 and h2 are constant.
Then if
R 1
0 /1x F1xdx ÿ h1
l1
P
R 1
0 /2x F2xdx ÿ h2
l2
;
13
a  1. Otherwise, a  0:
Since
R 1
0 /ix Fixdx=li is the average revenue,
and hi=li the average hiring cost per employee (per
unit time), condition (13) states that the expected
net pro®t (per unit time) of agency 1's workers is
higher than of agency 2's workers, and thus the
result is quite intuitive.
This result actually generalizes to any number
of agencies: The only agency used will be the one
with the highest value of
R 1
0 /ix Fixdx ÿ hi
li
: 14
Several important special cases are worth con-
sidering. The ®rst will assume that the agencies
supply workers with equal mean length-of-stay (as
was the case in the previous Section's example).
The variability of CLS and the productivity of
workers supplied by dierent agencies may vary,
however.
Corollary 1. Suppose that l1  l2. If
Z 1
0
/1x F1xdx ÿ
Z 1
0
/2x F2xdxPh1 ÿ h2
15
then a  1. Otherwise, a  0. If, in addition:
(i) F1  F2  F, then the condition reduces to
Z 1
0
/1xÿ/2x FxdxPh1 ÿ h2; 16
(ii) /1  /2  / (but F1 6 F2 the condition be-
comes
Z 1
0
/x F1xÿ F2xPh1 ÿ h2: 17
(iii) h1  h2 (but /1 6 /2 and F1 6 F2 the condi-
tion becomes
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0
/1x F1xdxP
Z 1
0
/2x F2xdx: 
18
Conditions (16) and (17) state that if the dif-
ference in fees between the agencies is smaller than,
respectively, the CLS-weighted ``productivity dif-
ference'' and the productivity-weighted ``CLS-
dierence'' the more expensive agency should be
chosen. Condition (18) states that only the agency
whose workers' expected productivity is higher will
be used (if mean CLS and hiring costs are the
same).
The next type of specialization assumes that
h1=l1  h2=l2 (though l1 6 l2). That is, the price
charged is proportional to the average stability of
workers the agency supplies.
Corollary 2. Suppose that h1=l1  h2=l2.I f
Z 1
0
/1x F1xdx=l1 P
Z 1
0
/2x F2xdx=l2
19
then a  1. Otherwise, a  0. 
That is, we use (only) the agency whose work-
ers' expected productivity is higher. That agrees
with intuition.
What if the only dierence between the agencies
of Corollary 2 is in the learning curves? That is,
what if F1  F2  F (and hence, l1  l2? In that
case, clearly, a  1i 
Z 1
0
/1xÿ/2x FxdxP0: 20
(This property is also a special case of (i) in
Corollary 1.) Thus, if /1xP/2x8 x, then
a  1. That is, if the productivity of workers
supplied by one agency is higher than that of the
other agency at all experience levels, that agency
should be the (only) one used. If such productivity-
dominance does not hold, the choice will depend
on F, as well as on /1 and /2.
The other relevant special case of (19) is
/1  /2 (but F1 6 F2 and, possibly, l1 6 l2). Here
the agencies dier only in the stability of the
workers they send. The initial productivity and
learning rate do not vary by agency, but learning
does take place. Thus we are comparing the
quantities
Z 1
0
/x F1xdx=l1 vs:
Z 1
0
/x F2xdx=l2:
This scenario is, in fact, quite rich, and can give
rise to a variety of behaviors, some quite surpris-
ing. We shall analyze it in some detail in Section 4,
under the assumption that one agency supplies
workers which tend to be more ``stable''.
4. Comparing stability patterns
What does one actually mean when saying that
some type of workers are more ``stable'' than
others? Presumably this is intended to say that one
type's CLS is longer than the other's. The CLS's
being random, however, the exact meaning of
``longer'' is not obvious. The natural concepts of
ordering random variables (or, equivalently, their
distributions) are those of stochastic order (e.g.,
Ross, 1996; Shaked and Shanthikumar, 1994). We
shall not provide here a complete review of these
concepts, but only de®ne those which will be used
in our context.
Let X and Y be random variables with distri-
butions F and G respectively, and let  F  1 ÿ F,
 G  1 ÿ G.
If  Ft=  Gt decreases in t, X is said to be
smaller than Y in the hazard rate order, denoted by
X 6 hrY.
If  Ft6  Gt8 t, X is said to be smaller than Y
in the usual stochastic order, denoted by X 6 stY.
This can be shown to be equivalent to E/X 6
E/Y for all increasing functions /.
If
R 1
x  Ftdt6
R 1
x  Gtdt 8x, X is said to be
smaller than Y in the increasing convex (``vari-
ability'') order, denoted by X 6 icxY. This can be
shown to be equivalent to E/X6E/Y for
all increasing convex functions /.
Clearly
X 6 hrY ) X 6 stY ) X 6 icxY ) EX6EY:
If the distributions of X and Y are not identical,
then X 6 stY ) EX < EY, but the combination
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the case of nonnegative variables with equal
means, X 6 icxY () X 6 cxY, where the latter or-
der is de®ned as E/X6E/Y for all convex
functions / (and thus, in particular, for variances).
Let Xe and Ye be the equilibrium variables cor-
responding to X and Y respectively. (Eq. (2) gives
the relation between equilibrium and original dis-
tribution.) Now, we know from (4) that the ex-
pected productivity of a worker with CLS X  F
equals
E/Xe 
Z 1
0
/xdFex
Z 1
0
/x Fxdx=l :
Thus, if Xe 6 stYe then the expected output associ-
ated with CLS Y will be larger than with CLS X
for all productivity functions /.
The question is, then, what type of order on X
and Y induces Xe 6 stYe. In the case of equal means,
the answer is rather simple:
Proposition 2 [Wol, 1989, p. 488]. If EX
EY then
X 6 icxY () Xe 6 stYe:
Thus, an increase in the variability of the CLS,
without change in mean, always increases the ex-
pected output. Increased uncertainty is thus ben-
e®cial here (!). The intuitive explanation of this is
that an increase in CLS' variability, by causing the
long-stayers to stay even longer, ups productivity
here more than the negative contribution to pro-
ductivity caused by the short-stayer staying even
shorter times. See also example given later.
Once the equal-means assumption is removed,
the situation changes drastically. In particular,
Wol (p. 489) provides an example which shows
that it is possible for both X 6 stY and Xe P stYe to
hold simultaneously in the strict sense. Thus, it is
possible that expected productivity will go down
for any increasing learning curve even though the
new CLS is stochastically longer (!)
Nevertheless, even when means are not equal,
sucient strengthening of the X 6Y order does
imply that Xe and Ye will be ordered.
Proposition 3 [Whitt, 1985].
X 6 hrY ) Xe 6 stYe:
Thus if scenario Y's stability is higher (turnover
is lower) than scenario X's in the sense of hazard
rate order (which is quite strong), experience will
increase stochastically and thus will productivity.
To gain more insight into which types of turn-
over reductions (internal, or via switching per-
sonnel agencies) are guaranteed to improve
productivity and which do not, suppose that the
CLS before the change has the simple two-point
distribution
X 
a w:p: p;
b w:p: 1 ÿ p;

where b > a > 0. The manpower planning litera-
ture refers to the group that stays a shorter time as
``fast movers'' and to those who stay longer ``slow
movers'''' (e.g., Bartholomew et al., 1991). Starting
with this base-scenario, we observe the outcomes
of potential changes in the parameters of the CLS
distribution (this example is based on Gerchak and
He, 1995):
(a) Suppose the new situation is
Y 
a ÿ ; w:p: p;
b  ; w:p: 1 ÿ p;

i.e., the fast movers leave even faster, while the
slow movers stay longer. If p  0:5, in which case
the mean stays unchanged, the expected produc-
tivity will go up. (Proposition 2). No surprise here.
(b) Suppose the new situation is
Y 
a  ; w:p: p;
b; w:p: 1 ÿ p;

> 0;
i.e., the fast movers stay longer than before. Then
the productivity might not go up. For example, if
p  0:5, a    1a n db  4, then EXe1:7,
while EYe5=3, and thus if /xx (in which
case expected productivity simply equals expected
age), expected productivity will go down. Indeed,
expected productivity will go down i <1:4.
An intuitive explanation to the seemingly
``strange'' behavior in this example is as follows. In
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the ``job'' 4/5 of the time, while in the ``lower
turnover'' scenario Y they occupy it only 4/6 of
the time. Thus, in the base scenario a ``random''
worker is more likely to be a slow mover and
hence, on the average, a more experienced worker.
We note that EYe > EXe guarantees an in-
crease in expected productivity only if productivity
is linear in age. Improvement is guaranteed for any
productivity curve only when Ye P stXe holds.
However, in our example,
Fex
2x=5  ; x61  ;
x    1=5  ; 1  <x64;

which, in the latter range, is increasing in . Thus,
this type of turnover reduction cannot guarantee
an increase in productivity.
(c) Suppose the new situation is
Y 
a; w:p: p ÿ d;
b; w:p: 1 ÿ p  d;
d

> 0;
i.e., the fraction of slow movers went up. Here
X 6 hrY. Then, despite the change in mean CLS,
the expected productivity will always go up
(Proposition 3).
5. Concluding remarks
This paper analyzes the trade-os involved in
hiring workers, primarily through external agen-
cies, aiming at balancing hiring cost and expected
contribution by workers, while accounting for
their stability and learning capabilities. We show
that when the agencies that supply the workers
oer incentives in exchange for increased share of
the hiring business, the optimal policy for the ®rm
involved may well be to use a mix of several
agencies for its personnel needs. Although we do
not show it explicitly, this outcome may be akin to
``second sourcing'' policies in inventory replen-
ishment. That is, even if no explicit incentives were
oered by the agencies, a more appropriate model
for describing the economics of hiring should in-
clude implicit charges to express the potential risk
that an agency will not be able to supply all the
workers it normally does. Adding such implicit
costs would lead to mixed policies, similar to the
consequences of the nonlinear costs here.
In the case of constant hiring charges, we show
that ®rms will always prefer a single agency, and
we provide the rules for determining the prefer-
ence. We note, however, that this solution is not
likely to be stable in dynamic settings. Other
manpower agencies not selected by the ®rm in the
®rst period will look for ways to change the situ-
ation in subsequent periods by reducing their fees
or by oering a dierent mix of workers. Finding
an equilibrium for such an environment could
possibly be achieved through game-theoretic
models, but since this goes beyond the scope of
this paper, we did not pursue it.
Since in practice many ®rms are functionally
decentralized, the personnel department may only
have a limited hiring budget. In the case that a
single agency (say, #1) ought to be used, the ex-
pected hiring costs per period are h1=l1. If that
exceed the hiring budget, while h2=l2 does not, a
mix of agencies may need to be used. The impli-
cations of budget constraints require further re-
search.
The most intriguing results of this paper are
given in Section 4. There we present counter-in-
tuitive scenarios in which increased turnover ac-
tually improves productivity. The importance of
this surprising result goes beyond manpower
hiring.
The models developed in this paper are appli-
cable in various industries and to dierent man-
power functions. For the most part, we address
situations in which a ®rm is recruiting salaried
employees to positions that are characterized by
relatively high turnover. Possible application areas
cover both manufacturing and service industries.
In manufacturing, these models may apply to the
hiring of production workers with speci®c skills
(welders, tool and die workers, machinists), as-
sembly workers or engineers at entry level posi-
tions in the high-tech manufacturing sector, skilled
construction workers, etc. In service industries, the
models could be relevant to the hiring of bank
tellers, supermarket cashiers, cooks and skilled
kitchen workers for hospitals and other public
facilities, etc.
202 Y. Gerchak, B. Golany / European Journal of Operational Research 125 (2000) 195±204On the other hand, the framework oered by
our models does not ®t the hiring of top execu-
tives, which is typically done by head-hunters op-
erating in circumstances dierent than those
assumed here (see also Terborg and Lee, 1984). It
is also unsuitable for modeling the hiring of low-
level temporary manpower that is normally
reached through classi®ed ads or through gov-
ernment employment agencies. Other marketplace
scenarios not captured by the model include cases
where personnel agencies represent the employees
and, on the other extreme, cases where an in-house
personnel oce assumes full responsibility over
hiring procedures. Outsourcing is another mar-
ketplace trend that is not discussed here. Our ex-
perience in Israel shows that a growing number of
®rms are outsourcing activities that are charac-
terized by large turnover. For example, commer-
cial banks that used to hire all of their tellers as
salaried employees (due to both conservative
management practices and powerful union agree-
ments) have recently outsourced a growing pro-
portion of the teller activities to manpower
agencies. Exploring turnover/productivity/cost
trade-os in such professions and institutional
settings would be a worthwhile future research
direction.
The practice of making a conscious decision to
assign speci®c proportions of a ®rm's hiring needs
to particular agencies is presently not wide-spread
among employers. However, there are cases in
which these phenomena do occur. The construc-
tion industry example, discussed in the Introduc-
tion, illustrates real-world situations where the
model's assumptions hold. Another example con-
cerns a large manufacturer who recently decided to
open a production facility where hundreds of as-
sembly workers will be required through the life-
time of the plant. The manufacturer is ready to
commit a certain proportion of its hiring business
to an agency that will guarantee supply of quali-
®ed workers whenever needed. The agency, on the
other hand, is willing to negotiate a special (re-
duced) price per hiree to secure this lucrative
business for many years.
Finally, we wish to stress that the model here
should be viewed primarily as normative rather
than empirical. Even though it addresses practices
that are rather rare today, it might provide the
tools for a variety of employers and personnel
agencies to enter into future business relations
in ways that will be more bene®cial to both parties.
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